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Abstract. Political liberalization provided space for students at the University of Yaounde to organize 
and voice their multiple grievances about the poor living and study conditions on campus and the process 
of “institutional liberalization,” blocking their pursuit of upward mobility. The unprecedented degree of 
violence that accompanied the protracted strike actions during the period 1990-96 may be attributed not 
only to the persistent refusal of the university authorities and the regime to enter into any meaningful 
form of dialogue with the students but also to the internal divisions among the students along party and 
ethno-regional lines. The major lines of division were between “stranger” students closely allied to the 
radical opposition and the “autochthonous” Beti students closely allied to the regime in power. With the 
support of the regime, the latter created various militia that resorted to violent forms of ethnic exclusion 
to re-establish control over “their” university. 
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The struggle for political liberalization, starting at the end of the 1980s, unleashed an 
unprecedented wave of student rebellion on university campuses in West and Central 
Africa (Kpatinde 1991). University students were often in the forefront of these 
struggles, sometimes with the support of secondary school students, their teachers and 
other socio-professional groups (Bratton and van de Walle 1992). 
Although there is a striking lack of studies on the role of students in the “democratic 
transition” (Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot 1995), the reasons for their widespread revolt seem 
to be similar. Political liberalization allowed space for students to voice their long-
standing grievances about the deteriorating living and study conditions at most African 
universities. The lack of basic infrastructure needed to cope with the massive growth in 
the student population since independence resulted in rapidly falling academic standards 
(Mbembe 1985; Tedga 1988; Lebeau 1997). The severe economic crisis and subsequent 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) aggravated the situation with an increasing 
withdrawal of state support for universities, university students and university graduates 
(Albert 1995; Federici 2000). Governments were compelled to make further cuts in 
university budgets, to request that students pay tuition fees and additional levies, and to 
virtually stop recruiting new graduates into already over-sized state bureaucracies. As a 
result of such state withdrawal, African universities no longer appeared to be serving as 
centers of elite formation. This process of “institutional liberalization” has been highly 
resented by the students in their pursuit of upward mobility.1 Comparing themselves 
with preceding generations who could count on getting government jobs because of 
their degrees, students nowadays see themselves as an “abandoned” or “lost” generation 
(Cruise O’Brien 1996). Little wonder that they have been inclined to see corrupt and 
authoritarian regimes as responsible for their predicament and to perceive a “democratic 
transition” as a necessary precondition for change in society in general and in 
universities in particular. In Mali, students made a significant contribution to the 
overthrow of the regime and the introduction of a multi-party system (Smith 1997) but 
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in most other African countries student rebellions have been brutally suppressed by the 
forces of law and order. 
In this article, I focus on the student revolt at the University of Yaounde – the only 
university institution in Cameroon until the 1993 university reforms. While 
Cameroonian university students share most of the grievances expressed by their 
counterparts in other West-Central African states, they appear to have played a 
somewhat different, and to a certain extent exceptional, role in the political 
liberalization process. Although political liberalization offered them the opportunity to 
organize to defend their interests, it also tended to divide them along ethno-regional 
lines. This led to an intensification of the simmering tensions between two groups of 
students: the “autochthonous” Beti students who tended to support the ruling Cameroon 
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) on the one hand, and the Anglophone and 
Bamileke “stranger” students who were more inclined to support the major opposition 
party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), on the other. Given the fact that the 
University of Yaounde was located in “their” territory, the Beti students claimed control 
of student politics in “their” university and were determined to combat any organization 
of “stranger” students that caused trouble on campus and strove for the overthrow of the 
regime. The growing polarization between these two groups of students, fueled by the 
regime, ethnic entrepreneurs and the press, gave rise to an explosion of violence and the 
emergence on campus of a Beti militia engaged in various forms of ethnic exclusion. 
Unlike student rebellions in other parts of West and Central Africa, unrest and violence 
on the University of Yaounde campus lasted almost uninterrupted for six years from 
1990 to 1996. 
In the first section of this article I explore the development of student organization 
along ethno-regional lines during political liberalization, while the second section 
presents a detailed report of the 1990-96 student revolt.2 
 
 
Political Liberalization and Student Organization along Ethno-Regional Lines 
 
After its creation in 1961, the University of Yaounde experienced relatively few student 
protests until the beginning of the 1990s. Some were politically motivated but most 
were prompted by the students’ frequent worries about bourse et bouffe (grants and 
food), especially the quality and quantity of food and the number, amount and timely 
payment of scholarships. 
The relative absence of any serious student unrest during the first three decades of 
the university’s existence is understandable. Students undoubtedly belonged among the 
most privileged of the political system and were constantly told that they would be the 
future leaders soon to be co-opted into the regime. A university degree gave almost 
automatic access to one of the many potentially lucrative posts in the expanding civil 
service or public sector. Even when the supply of graduates became much larger than 
the demand for them in the 1970s, President Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961-82) and his 
successor, Paul Biya, continued to create job openings for them in the administration. 
For example, to alleviate pressures on the labour market, the Biya government recruited 
1,500 new graduates in the already over-sized state bureaucracy in 1983 and another 
1,700 in 1985. Moreover, in an attempt to preserve student loyalty following Biya's 
ascendancy to power in 1982, the government increased both the amount and the 
number of scholarships in 1984 (Mehler 1993:296). And, if the “carrot” did not keep the 
students quiet, the authoritarian post-colonial regimes did not hesitate to use the “stick.” 
 3
Several factors explain why the students’ behavior changed so dramatically at the 
beginning of the 1990s, manifest in their frequent and protracted strike actions. First and 
foremost, there was growing dissatisfaction with the deepening crisis within the 
university and the lack of employment prospects for university graduates. Mockingly, 
students referred to their university as “the bachelors’ cemetery.” The number of 
students increased from 35 in 1961 to 10,000 in 1982 and 41,000 in 1992 (Mehler 
1998:59; Mbu 1993:82) but the university infrastructure was able to provide for at most 
7,000 students (Anonymous 1991). Lecture rooms, libraries, laboratories and office 
space for lecturers were inadequate and lacked necessary equipment. The university 
hostel could offer accommodation to a limited number of students, often on the basis of 
patronage or ethnic criteria and the vast majority of students were compelled to look for 
accommodation themselves, often in the so-called “mini-cities” around the university, 
constructed mostly by entrepreneurs closely connected with the university authorities or 
the regime. Rooms were rented at exorbitant prices, FCFA 10,000 or more per month, 
very expensive for students on an average scholarship of FCFA 30,000. Lecturers had a 
heavy teaching load but poor conditions of service (Ouendji 1996). In addition to badly 
stocked libraries, this was one of the reasons for frequent sales to students, at vast 
prices, of stereotyped lecture notes dubbed polycops. 
Given the inadequate infrastructure, it is not surprising that the quality of degrees 
offered by the university continued to fall. Failure rates were extremely high, reaching 
80 percent in the Faculty of Law and Economic Science (Anonymous 1991). Poor 
educational standards further lowered graduates’ employment chances. Besides this 
structural crisis, there was also a moral crisis: large-scale fraud during examinations, 
and sexual harassment. 
Above all, there appears to have been no clear separation between politics and 
academics. All appointments at the university, from that of the Chancellor right down to 
messengers and cleaners, were political appointments. Loyalty to the regime appears to 
have been more important than intellectual merit for a university career (Nyamnjoh 
1999). A number of professors close to the regime, for example Mono Ndjana, Fame 
Ndongo, Bipoum Woum and Eno Belinga, were regularly absent from the university, 
having been recruited by the regime and the CPDM for information campaigns 
throughout the country. The administration of the university appeared to be geared 
predominantly towards political control. National security agents could be found 
disguised as students constantly spying on students and lecturers. As one student put it, 
“the so-called scholarship is really a bribe in exchange for freedom of thought and 
expression” (Gobata 1993:98-99). 
The university was administered in an authoritarian manner with little dialogue 
between the university authorities and the academic staff and students. Unlike some 
other West and Central African countries such as Senegal (Diop 1992; Bathily et al. 
1995), Ghana (Amoa 1977; Oquaye 1996) and Nigeria (Ojo 1995; Lebeau 1997), no 
student union in Cameroon was allowed to represent and defend student interests. The 
so-called delegates or student representatives were not elected by the students after 1986 
but were appointed by the administration. They are responsible for imposing the 
decisions of the university authorities upon the students while taking note of those who 
complain (Dibussi 1991:16; Mbu 1993:107). Worse still, they tended to become 
informants who pointed out subversives to the regime in times of crisis. Lack of 
participation in university affairs created the impression among students that revolt was 
the only avenue to change in the university. 
While the deepening crisis in the university was a constant source of frustration 
among students, the changing economic and political environment in Cameroon had a 
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radicalizing effect on them. The economic crisis that hit Cameroon – once one of the 
most prosperous countries in Africa – in the mid-1980s and the subsequent 
implementation of a SAP in 1988/89 (Konings 1986a) aggravated the students’ 
predicament. There were no longer any funds available for improving the university 
infrastructure. There were regular delays in the payment of scholarships, causing many 
hardships among students, and there was an almost total stop in new recruitment into 
the state bureaucracy. Like other social strata, students tended to attribute the economic 
ills and the concomitant process of institutional liberalization to the corrupt and 
authoritarian Biya regime. 
The political liberalization process that started in 1990 was a decisive factor in the 
student rebellion.3 It actually appears to have had an ambivalent impact on the students. 
On the one hand, it created space for students to organize in defense of their interests 
but on the other hand, it tended to divide them. The introduction of a multi-party system 
and the regionalization of political competition (Eyoh 1998) split students along party 
and ethno-regional lines. Political liberalization even encouraged an obsession with 
autochthony among students, leading to violent forms of exclusion of “strangers”, 
fueled by the Biya regime in its struggle for survival in multi-party elections (Geschiere 
and Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 2001). The major line of division among students became 
the following: the autochthonous Beti students who tended to support the ruling party, 
the CPDM, led by President Paul Biya who was himself a Beti versus the Anglophone 
and Bamileke “strangers” lumped together as “Anglo-Bami” who generally supported 
the main opposition party, the SDF, led by Anglophone John Fru Ndi.4 To fully 
understand this cleavage and the violence that accompanied the struggle between the 
two groups of students during political liberalization, it is necessary to point out that 
animosities between the Beti and Anglo-Bami have a long historical background not 
only at the University of Yaounde but also in Yaounde and Beti territory as a whole. 
There was, first of all, the large-scale migration, set in motion during French 
colonial rule, from the Grassfields – the region of the Francophone Bamileke (the 
present West Province) and Anglophone ethnic-related peoples (the present North West 
Province of Anglophone Cameroon) – to Yaounde and other Beti towns. The Bamileke, 
renowned in Cameroon for their “entrepreneurial ethos” (Warnier 1993), migrated in 
large numbers to Yaounde, acquiring more and more land to build their own houses and 
coming to dominate the city’s commercial sector to a large extent. Especially after 
independence (1960), the local population began to express their fears of becoming 
overwhelmed by the Bamileke in their own area, evoking tensions between the two 
groups and, sometimes, violent clashes. 
Tensions between the two groups increased after Paul Biya came to power in 1982. 
While Biya’s predecessor, Ahidjo, had constantly emphasized the need for ethnic 
balance (Ngayap 1993; Nkwi and Nyamnjoh 1997), there is ample evidence to suggest 
that the Bamileke – besides Ahidjo’s own Fulbe ethnic group – enjoyed a privileged 
position regarding capital accumulation during his presidency. It is generally believed in 
Cameroon that they owed this privilege to Ahidjo’s eagerness to obtain the necessary 
support of the Bamileke elite in his determined efforts to pacify the Bamileke territory 
that was, until about 1970, one of the major areas of the Union des Populations du 
Cameroun (UPC) rebellion against the regime (Joseph 1977). The Beti elite saw the 
transfer of power from Ahidjo to Biya as simply an opportunity to seize power from the 
Fulbe and Bamileke and advance their own economic and political interests. Initially 
encountering great difficulties in consolidating his power (Takougang and Krieger 
1998), Biya started to give in to these ethnic pressures. In protest against the increasing 
Beti monopoly on economic and political power, Bamileke businessmen then withdrew 
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their savings from banks and transferred them to informal savings circuits called 
tontines (Henry et al. 1991). This contributed to the banks’ growing liquidity problems 
and to the economic crisis. 
The growing tensions between the Beti and the Bamileke were also manifest in the 
ethnic discourse and repeated ethnic clashes at the University of Yaounde. Following 
publication of the book L’idée sociale chez Paul Biya in 1985, there was a fierce debate 
between its author, Mono Ndjana, a professor of philosophy and one of the most faithful 
ideologues of the regime, and Maurice Kamto, an eminent professor of law. This 
intellectual debate between a Beti (Mono Ndjana) and a Bamileke (Maurice Kamto) 
rapidly developed into an ethnic confrontation. In the course of another debate at the 
university on March 11, 1987, about the political literature in Cameroon, Mono Ndjana 
accused some Bamileke colleagues of “ethno-fascism” in the sense that they were 
exhorting their own ethnic group to end their current marginalization and win political 
power (Collectif “Changer le Cameroun” 1992:19-25). In reaction, one of the accused, 
the philosopher Sindjoun Pokam, developed his theory of “mono-fascism.” This term 
refers not only to the name of his adversary, Mono Ndjana, but also to attempts by one 
single ethnic group, the Beti, to monopolize power in Cameroon (Pokam 1987). 
Obviously, such debates resulted in an intensification of the existing tensions between 
the two groups in the university. 
Like the Bamileke, the Anglophones were seen as another threat to Beti power. I 
have argued elsewhere that the Anglophone minority deeply regrets its vote for 
reunification with the Francophone majority in 1961, feeling marginalized, exploited 
and assimilated by the Francophone-dominated state and Francophones as a whole 
(Konings 1996b; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997). In the wake of Biya’s accession to 
power in 1982, they began to openly protest against their allegedly second-class 
citizenship in Cameroon and to call for a return to the federal state or outright secession. 
The Anglophone students at the University of Yaounde were the first to express 
Anglophone disenchantment with the Biya regime. Their initiative can be explained by 
the many hardships they experienced at the university. Though officially a bilingual 
institute, the University of Yaounde has clearly remained a Francophone institute. The 
Anglophone students protested when, in September 1983, the Beti Minister of National 
Education promulgated an order modifying the Anglophone General Certificate of 
Education (GCE) examination by making it similar to the Francophone baccalaureate. 
Apparently the order was intended to facilitate the entry of Anglophone students into 
the country’s professional and technical institutes, which were exclusively based on the 
French system. The Anglophone students, however, interpreted the proposed reform as 
a subtle attempt by the Francophone-dominated state to assimilate the Anglophone 
educational system. They maintained that the problem of Anglophone exclusion from 
the professional and technical institutes in the country could not be solved by 
assimilation but rather by the creation of institutes based on the English system. Their 
ensuing demonstrations and boycott of classes met with extreme police brutality 
(Nyamnjoh 1996a). They used this protest action to voice other grievances including the 
recent dismissal of Dr Bisong, an Anglophone lecturer in the Faculty of Law and 
Economics, allegedly for offering one of the few courses in English in the officially 
bilingual university.5 The situation did not calm down until eleven days later when 
President Biya issued a statement calling on students to return to classes and 
announcing the setting-up of a commission composed of highly qualified and 
experienced Anglophones and Francophones to look into the students’ grievances. 
The greatest shock to the Beti and the regime came in May 1990 when the first 
opposition party in the country, the SDF, was launched in Bamenda, the capital of the 
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North West Province of Anglophone Cameroon.6 Leading members of the regime 
condemned the Anglophones for this treacherous action. The Beti mayor of Yaounde, 
Emah Basile, referred to the Anglophones as “the enemies in the house.” The fact that 
the SDF rapidly spread its influence among the Anglophones and ethnic-related 
Bamileke heightened the panic in government circles and hardened Beti attitudes 
towards the Anglo-Bami, perceiving the latter’s alliance as the greatest challenge to 
their position of power. 
In Yaounde and other Beti towns the autochthonous population found it 
unacceptable that Anglo-Bami “strangers” or “settlers” would try to help the SDF to 
gain power. As “strangers” they should not try to rule in the home region of their 
landlords but instead should vote CPDM or else go home and vote for their own party. 
Newly founded Beti vigilante groups, such as Commando Delta, Direct Action, and the 
National Front for Beti Liberation, signed highly incendiary tracts, referring to the 
Anglo-Bami as “exploitative, domineering, unscrupulous, and ungrateful invaders” and 
calling on them to leave or face the consequences (Collectif “Changer le Cameroun” 
1992). On several occasions, Beti mobs and vigilante groups attacked Anglo-Bami 
property in Yaounde while the security forces stood by indifferently (Nkwi and Socpa 
1997). One such occasion was in 1991 when the so-called National Coordination of 
Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA), in which the SDF played a leading role, 
organized a protracted “ghost town” campaign7 to force the Biya regime to agree to a 
sovereign national conference. Another occasion was during the 1992 presidential 
elections when the chairman of the SDF, John Fru Ndi, made significant inroads into 
Yaounde thanks to the large Anglo-Bami diaspora: 39 percent of the votes cast against 
52 percent for Paul Biya. Following these fraudulent elections, John Fru Ndi accused 
Biya of stealing his victory. Yet another occasion was the 1996 municipal elections, 
which took place a few days after the promulgation of a new constitution promising 
state protection for minorities and the autochthonous population (Geschiere and 
Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 2001). 
The autochthony discourse and ethnic exclusion became part and parcel of 
university life when students started organizing in 1990. On the one hand, there 
emerged what was initially called the National Coordination of Cameroon Students but 
later changed its name to the Students’ Parliament or simply Parliament. It was by far 
the largest student union on campus. While the Anglo-Bami students formed the core of 
its membership and leadership, students from other ethnic groups outside the Beti area 
also formed part of its membership. Many Parliament members lived in one of the mini-
cities around the university called Bonamoussadi and, particularly during the heyday of 
student rebellion, they tended to assemble almost daily at their meeting-place at Bassora 
in Bonamoussadi. Parliament soon came under the influence of the opposition parties, 
notably the SDF. Parliament members agreed with the opposition that an overthrow of 
the regime was required to bring about real change in society at large and in the 
university in particular. The Anglophone members equally championed the 
establishment of an Anglophone university. Parliament leaders often presented 
themselves as revolutionaries who were prepared to use all means at their disposal, 
including demonstrations, strikes and acts of vandalism, should the regime and the 
university authorities fail to listen to or to give in to their demands. 
On the other hand, a Committee for Self-Defense was called into being by the 
regime to counteract the actions of Parliament. Its leadership and membership was 
mainly Beti but some members of other ethnic groups were also part of the Self-Defense 
group. For example, one of its principal leaders, “General” Ngoufack, was a Bamileke. 
He hailed from the same village as Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni who used to be 
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Professor of Political Science at the university before being appointed Minister of 
Information and Culture and a government spokesman. He and other non-Beti members 
were recruited by the regime to give the public the impression that the Self-Defense 
group was not an exclusively Beti affair but an organization of responsible students. 
Ngoufack was well rewarded for his services and was given a lucrative job in the 
National Ports Authority after his graduation despite the freeze in public-sector 
employment. 
Most of the Beti members of the Self-Defense group believed that Parliament was 
out to destroy “their” university and to remove “their” government from power. Others 
perceived Parliament as a group of vandals set to disturb the academic year and to 
destroy university property, while claiming that they were defending the rights of the 
responsible students. Others had just joined the group because they were given cash 
and, in some cases, free lodgings by the regime in return for their combat with 
Parliament. Since the Committee for Self-Defense was made up of only a small 
minority of the students, they were allowed to carry weapons, including clubs, knives 
and pistols, to attack members and sympathizers of Parliament. They were even alleged 
to be involved in crimes, such as murders, to incriminate Parliament members. 
The Committee for Self-Defense worked closely with the Beti vigilante groups on 
campus, particularly the self-styled Direct Action group that openly declared that the 
University of Yaounde was on Beti land and thus should fall under Beti control. It often 
declared that the Anglo-Bami students should either recognize Beti control or “go 
home.” Sometimes, however, the Self-Defense group composed of Beti and non-Beti 
students, appeared to distance itself from this ethnic militia: 
 
The Committee for Self-Defense is different from the other vigilante groups because 
these other groups have objectives, which are unknown. Meanwhile, everyone knows 
the objectives of our committee and it works in the interest of the majority of 
students who are regularly admitted into the university.8  
 
Becoming increasingly aware that it constituted only a minority among the student 
population, the Self-Defense group was prepared to enter into negotiations with their 
colleagues from Parliament. For instance, in a circular issued on May 6, 1992, it 
declared: 
 
Together let’s save the University of Yaounde. 
• Conscious of the fact that violence cannot solve any problem, 
• Conscious of the fact that discord among the students is disadvantageous to 
the representation of their interests, and 
• Conscious equally of the fact that we have got the same academic problem, 
The Committee for Self-Defense demands a dialogue, a debate, with our friends of 
Parliament.9  
 
Following the formation of the Committee for Self-Defense and the Beti vigilante 
groups, which received logistical support from the forces of law and order, Parliament 
created its own commandos to fight these hostile groups and to protect its members. 
 
 
Political Liberalization and Student Revolt, 1990-96 
 
From 1990 to 1996 the University of Yaounde barely functioned, with university life 
being repeatedly paralyzed by student protest and revolt. During this period there were 
regular violent confrontations between Parliament on the one hand and the Committee 
 8
for Self-Defense, the Beti vigilante groups and the forces of law and order on the other. 
In this section, I focus on three such confrontations. The first occurred in 1991 
following Parliament’s call for a sovereign national conference. The second took place 
in 1993 after Parliament’s protest against the introduction of university tuition fees and 
the third occurred in 1996 following Parliament’s resistance of the university 
authorities’ imposition of special levies on students in addition to tuition fees. 
 
Parliament and the holding of a Sovereign National Conference, 1991 
 
Relations between the students and the state and university authorities started to 
deteriorate from 1990 onwards. On March 26, 1990, a number of mostly Anglophone 
students marched in support of launching the SDF in Bamenda and the introduction of a 
multi-party system in the country. The government press falsely accused them of having 
sung the Nigerian national anthem (Ngniman 1993; Kamto 1993).10 Subsequently, the 
gendarmes, usually called ninjas by the students and other sections of the population, 
harassed and brutalized the students, looted their property and arrested about three 
hundred of them.11 Apparently the students’ so-called delegates, appointed by the 
university authorities, were involved in this oppression and pointed out to the 
gendarmes the rooms of the Anglophone students and even joined them in torturing 
their fellow students (Dibussi 1991). Little wonder that this behavior by “their” 
delegates contributed to the students’ pursuit of an autonomous organization. This 
march by Anglophone students incited disaffection and resentment among the 
autochthonous Beti population on and off campus, with some Beti landlords threatening 
to remove Anglophone students from their houses. To forestall any further student 
protest actions, the regime stationed the ninjas permanently on campus. 
Tensions remained high on campus for the rest of the year. In July 1990 students 
lodged a complaint with the Chancellor, Professor Joel Moulen, that a number of them 
had been paid FCFA 10,000 less than the amount stipulated in the text regulating their 
scholarships. Since no further payments were forthcoming, they marched on the 
Ministry of Higher Education. When the Minister failed to settle the issue, they started 
mounting roadblocks on campus. Fearing that the matter would escalate, the university 
authorities then decided to pay the students.12 In September of the same year some 
second and third-year students in the Faculty of Law and Economics protested against 
mass failures in the examinations13 and by the end of November, Anglophone students 
had started boycotting classes to press home their demands. Undergraduates in the 
Department of English Language and Literature complained about overcrowding in 
lecture rooms. English private law students protested about discrimination, bitterly 
lamenting that some of their courses were in French while French private law students 
had no courses at all in English.14  
It was in this context of growing tension on campus and the gradual opening of 
space for organization during the political liberalization process that the National 
Coordination of Cameroon Students was formed under the leadership of Benjamin 
Senfo Tonkam, a Bamileke student. Its first public activity was on August 15,1990, 
when it addressed an open letter to the Head of State, stressing that higher education in 
Cameroon was “sick and without repairs,” being characterized by “inadequate 
infrastructures, anachronism and arbitrariness.”15 It further stated that university 
students in Cameroon were among the most wretched in Africa, being faced with poor 
nutritional standards, housing conditions and transport facilities, low scholarships, 
language barriers, and exploitation by their professors. It requested the Head of State 
look into the matter of growing unemployment rates among university graduates and the 
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militarization of the university campus after the May 26, 1990 Bamenda incident. It also 
appealed to him to reform the university so that it would become a veritable school of 
tolerance and dialogue and regain its lost credibility. The National Coordination of 
Cameroon Students was soon to be called Parliament, which became closely allied with 
the newly created opposition parties, in particular the SDF. 
The emergence and increasing politicization of Parliament disturbed the university 
authorities and the regime. Their worries appeared to be justified when, after some 
earlier skirmishes (Mehler 1993:297; Mbu 1993), an initially peaceful demonstration by 
Parliament on April 2, 1991, formed the prelude to a two-month explosion of violence 
on campus. On that day, Parliament members marched in support of the opposition 
parties’ call for the holding of a sovereign national conference and an unconditional 
general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles. The government strongly condemned 
their actions, attributing them to student manipulation by the opposition parties. The 
Head of State warned the students to remain aloof from politics, insisting that the 
university was a temple of learning and not a haven of politics: “La politique aux 
politiciens, l’école aux écoliers.” In reaction, Parliament leaders maintained that if the 
authorities were sincere about purging the university of politics, they should start 
dissolving all the CPDM branches and youth movements on campus and bar the 
university population from participating in CPDM rallies and other CPDM propaganda 
activities (Dibussi 1991). Moreover, they claimed that the holding of a sovereign 
national conference could make a significant contribution to solving the problems at the 
university and in society as a whole. As one Parliament leader put it: 
 
A sovereign national conference is a forum for collective self-confession, a platform 
to point out past mistakes and to elaborate new codes of conduct – a process that will 
inevitably lead to a positive restructuring of our unadapted educational system and its 
mediocre university and that will eventually lay the foundation for the resolution of 
post-university problems such as unemployment.16 
 
The student demonstrations on 2 April were dispersed by the gendarmes but the 
following day Parliament members marched again, burning vehicles, including that of 
the Chancellor, and smashing the windows of the Chancellery. The Chancellor then 
requested that the security forces protect university property and students who refused 
to take part in the demonstrations. Subsequently, the gendarmes guarding the campus 
were reinforced by new troops. This combined force immediately moved into action, 
spraying tear gas over students in excessive quantities, looting their rooms, raping some 
of the girls and torturing anyone arrested. The authorities were indifferent to such 
brutalities. Parliament commandos challenged the security forces daily, throwing stones 
in intifada-style and then withdrawing as well as chanting liberation songs like “Today 
may be the last day, we don’t know.” They also tried to protect students in the 
residential areas against attacks by the Self-Defense group. They developed a system of 
whistle signals for meeting each other, attacking, withdrawing and so on. Besides Senfo 
Tonkam, three other Bamileke leaders of Parliament became well known to the 
Cameroonian public during this period thanks to the media, namely Corentin Talla, 
nicknamed “Schwartzkopf,” Robert Wanto nicknamed “Colin Powell” and Blaise 
Yimga Yotchou nicknamed “Abou Nidal.” 
Assuming that the situation was more or less under control, troops withdrew from 
the campus on 19 April without notifying the Chancellor. Parliament members used this 
opportunity to assault those lecturers and students who were hostile to Parliament, 
leading to renewed occupation of the campus by the security forces. Parliament leaders 
then decided to halt all activities on campus until further notice and to advise their 
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fellow students to leave. Curiously, on 21 April, the leader of Parliament, Senfo 
Tonkam, who had been hiding in the US embassy, was escorted to the campus by US 
marine bodyguards to announce the so-called Operation Ghost Campus (Boulaga 
1997:92-93). 
On 4 May, Parliament held a meeting at the university sports complex approved by 
the Chancellor. An estimated crowd of 25,000 students attended this meeting chanting 
the popular freedom song of the famous Cameroonian singer Anne-Marie Ndze. 
Parliament leaders reiterated their demands for the organization of a sovereign national 
conference, summed up all the students’ grievances and called for solidarity among 
students (Lisinge undated). After the meeting, some Parliament members were attacked 
and wounded by Direct Action, the Beti militia linked to the Committee for Self-
Defense. On Monday morning, 6 May, Parliament members marched to see the 
Chancellor, providing him with a report of their meeting and requesting protection 
against any further attacks by the Beti vigilante groups. In his reply, the Chancellor 
avoided addressing any of the points raised by the students. The latter then decided to 
leave and to assemble in the afternoon at their usual meeting place at Bassora to devise 
future strategies. 
One of the unexpected guests at the afternoon meeting was “General” Ngoufack, the 
principal leader of the Self-Defense group. He told Parliament members that he was 
attending their meeting without the knowledge of his own group. He then declared his 
willingness to enter into negotiations with the leaders of Parliament. Although he then 
left the meeting, rumours were already spreading on campus that he had been 
“hijacked” by Parliament, which understandably led to commotion in Self-Defense 
group circles, and among the university authorities and the government. The Self-
Defense group reacted swiftly by capturing three members of Parliament with a view to 
holding them hostage until Ngoufack was freed. In the meantime, the Chancellor had 
notified the government authorities of the dangerous situation and the government then 
ordered an end to Parliament's meeting. 
The security forces arrived when the students were about to leave the meeting and, 
without any notice, charged brutally. The Self-Defense group, the Beti militia and the 
Beti inhabitants of the nearby quarters also attacked fleeing students. Soldiers again 
invaded students’ residences in Bonamoussadi, looting property, raping girls and 
arresting any student caught up in the violence. Reportedly, 218 students were arrested 
but there were contradictory reports about the number of deaths, disappearances and 
injuries. While the private press spoke of several deaths, the government was less than 
precise in its reports. The Minister of Information and Culture and government 
spokesman, Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, began a swift rise to prominence in the 
regime and notoriety in the opposition by claiming “zéro mort” (no deaths). Realizing 
that the population was shocked by such an unprecedented degree of violence on 
campus, on 15 May the Biya government appointed a nine-man committee headed by 
Chief Justice (retired) Sam Endeley, an Anglophone with close ties to the regime, to 
investigate the matter. In its final report, the committee was critical of the role of the 
university authorities and the forces of law and order but it came to the conclusion that 
there were “no deaths, no rapes, no disappearances.” While the opposition strongly 
contested the committee’s conclusions, the government was clearly pleased with the 
report. Soon after its publication, Endeley was appointed Bakweri Paramount Chief – a 
position that had been vacant for a considerable period of time (Geschiere 1993). 
The day after what came to be known in student circles as the “Bassora Massacre”, 
on May 7, 1991, Parliament leaders protested against these events by declaring a 
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boycott of classes for the remainder of the year. On the same day, many members of 
Parliament left their rooms in Bonamoussadi and other mini-cities around the university. 
Renewed brutal charges by the security forces on student residences followed after a 
student, Ndam Souley who was believed to have been a government informant, was 
killed by a Molotov cocktail on 15 May. Government and Parliament accused each 
other of having committed this crime. Being charged with murder and wanted by the 
police, Parliament leaders such as Schwartzkopf, Colin Powell and Abu Nidal, sought 
refuge in the building of the EEC representation in Yaounde where they were later 
refused political asylum. Senfo Tonkam was arrested on 23 May and was subsequently 
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. 
The government was eventually prepared to make some concessions to Parliament 
to induce them to end Operation Ghost Campus. It first announced that two new 
universities would be created, one of which would be an Anglophone university as 
demanded by the Anglophone students. It then dismissed the Chancellor, Joel Moulen, 
and replaced him with Dr Peter Agbor Tabi, the first Anglophone to occupy this 
position. When this strategy failed to yield the desired results, the government resorted 
to intimidation. It threatened students by announcing that anyone not attending lectures 
would be considered dismissed or having withdrawn from the university. From the end 
of May onwards students began to return to the university. The university authorities 
forced the ill-prepared students to sit the end-of-the-year examinations so as not to lose 
the academic year and their own credibility. Examinations were finally held under tight 
security. 
 
Parliament and the introduction of tuition fees, 1993 
 
Like his predecessor, the new Chancellor, Peter Agbor Tabi, appeared not to be 
interested in any form of regular consultation with Parliament. He became almost 
obsessed with strengthening control over the students. In a time of deepening crisis 
when the government claimed that there was no money to improve the university 
infrastructure and to pay salaries and scholarships regularly, he erected the so-called 
Berlin Wall to facilitate control over the students’ by the security forces, the Committee 
for Self-Defense and the Beti militia. 
It soon turned out that his efforts to maintain control were unsuccessful. By 
December 12, 1991, Parliament had staged another prolonged strike against the delay in 
the payment of scholarships. A new round of violence and confrontation between 
Parliament and its opponents occurred on campus after Parliament’s leaders had 
declared a renewed Operation Ghost Campus. Violence reached a climax in “The Night 
of the Long Knives” on January 20, 1992, when the ninjas stormed Bonamoussadi, 
again brutalizing and raping students, looting their property and arresting over 35 of 
them.  
A few months later, Parliament announced that 6 May would be a day of Ghost 
Campus in honor of the martyrs of May 6, 1991 Bassora Massacre. In the days 
preceding 6 May the Beti militia were distributing tracts in and around campus, 
threatening the Anglo-Bami students and admonishing them to go home. In a circular, 
the Committee for Self-Defense announced that it was going to celebrate its historic 
victory over Parliament on May 6, 1991.17 During the night of 5 May, a Bamileke 
female student, Guiadem Ange Tekam, the director of the students’ newspaper The 
Voice of the Student, was molested by the security forces, forced to march naked 
through Bonamoussadi and then detained. She was accused of having distributed tracts 
calling on students to march on 6 May. On Martyrs’ Day itself (6 May), some 15 
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Parliament members were subjected after their arrest to dehumanizing and savage 
treatment by the security forces. They were severely beaten, bathed in mud, their hair 
shaved with broken bottles, their faces painted with a black substance, and then 
transferred to some of the newly established torture cells. On 8 May, some 500 third-
year female students from the Faculty of Law and Economics staged a peaceful protest 
march to the Chancellery. Their ultimatum to boycott classes until the unconditional 
release of their colleague, Miss Guiadem Ange Tekam, was simply ignored by the 
Chancellor, Peter Agbor Tabi. 
The new chancellor was to face an even greater student challenge at the beginning of 
1993. On January 19, 1993, Professor Titus Edzoa, the then Minister of Higher 
Education, announced on CRTV the long-expected university reforms. The most 
important were the following: 
• the establishment of six, more manageable, university institutions in the 
country; 
• the introduction of a system of credits for two semesters of 14 weeks each 
(students needed at least a 70 percent pass rate to be promoted to the next 
class); and 
• students were to pay tuition fees of FCFA 50,000 a year, a sum which could 
be paid in two installments. 
 
The payment of tuition fees was particularly shocking to the students since the 
Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, and the Minister of Higher Education, Titus 
Edzoa, had both declared during the 1992 presidential elections that university tuition 
fees would not be introduced. While still engaged in the struggle for the regular 
payment of their scholarships, the students were suddenly told they had to pay for their 
own university education and forget about their unpaid scholarships. In addition, the 
students argued that they could not be compelled to pay fees at a time when their 
parents’ incomes had been dramatically curtailed due to drastic cuts in salaries and 
agricultural commodities and the living and study conditions on campus were so poor.18 
Immediately after the announcement of the university reforms, the members of 
Parliament assembled at Bassora where they decided to stage a peaceful demonstration 
in town and to boycott classes. They then marched into town, chanting anti-Biya songs 
and setting a huge effigy of Biya ablaze. When they started mounting barricades, the 
gendarmes attacked them. Some sustained injuries, others were arrested. Forced to 
withdraw, they staged another demonstration in town the following day where the 
gendarmes again confronted them with water canons, tear gas, beatings and arrests. 
Back on campus, they set fire to a Faculty of Science building housing a geology 
laboratory and the offices of some fifty lecturers. 
In a circular issued by Parliament, it was alleged that the Chancellor, Peter Agbor 
Tabi, then instructed his militia on campus to increase raids on students both on campus 
and in residential areas. These raids, the circular said, “were intended to brutalize 
students and destroy their goods so that, intimidated, fewer and fewer students would 
have the courage to join the boycott of tuition fees.” Agbor Tabi was quoted as saying 
“blood should flow, if necessary, so that the students either pay their fees or go back to 
their home provinces to do farm work.”19 Apparently, the security forces, the Self-
Defense group and the Beti militia, which started terrorizing Parliament members and 
destroying or looting their property, carried out Agbor Tabi’s instructions religiously. 
Violence reigned on campus for months. During the night of 24-25 April, a second-
year Bamileke student, Collins Djongoué Kamga, was set on fire in his room. He was 
said to have paid part of his tuition fees against Parliament’s instructions. The regime 
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was therefore quick to make Parliament responsible for this murder. Even the 
confession by a Beti member of the Committee for Self-Defense on Radio Africa No. 1 
on 30 April that his group was responsible for this heinous crime did not deter the 
regime from punishing Parliament members. Without further investigation, the Minister 
of Higher Education then summarily dismissed 35 members of Parliament from the 
university. An additional list of 17 names was circulating and persons on this list felt in 
danger (Boulaga 1997:143). In an interview after this incident, the Chancellor declared 
that the Committee for Self-Defense had every right to protect the interests of the 
responsible students in view of the unstable situation on campus. 
One of the consequences of the mysterious assassination was that students started 
paying their fees for fear of being executed should they fail to do so. The authorities, 
which were considered to have ended this protracted strike successfully, were rewarded 
for their services a few weeks later. Following a cabinet reshuffle, the Minister of 
Higher Education, Titus Edzoa, was promoted to Secretary-General at the Presidency, 
one of the most powerful positions in Cameroon, while the Chancellor, Peter Agbor 
Tabi, moved up into Edzoa’s former post. 
 
Parliament and the imposition of special levies on students, 1996 
 
Parliament members had vehemently resisted the introduction of the FCFA 50,000 
university tuition fee in 1993. They became even more restive when the university 
authorities began to impose additional levies upon students, including FCFA 5,000 for 
pre-registration, FCFA 5,000 for medical costs (supposed to cover the costs of X-rays 
that were never carried out), FCFA 1,000 for transcripts of examination results, and 
FCFA 1,500 for the use of laboratory facilities in the Faculty of Science. In addition, the 
cost of participation in the catch-up summer session in September was FCFA 25,000 
despite the fact that students could follow no more than four courses during this session. 
The imposition of some new levies, such as the payment of FCFA 100 for each visit to 
the library at night, FCFA 50 for studying in one of the lecture rooms at weekends and 
FCFA 25 for the use of toilet facilities, was seen by the students as provocation. 
It was not until 1996 that Parliament leaders laid their hands on the 1993 university 
reform decrees. They then discovered that the imposition of special levies was not 
covered by the decrees’ text of application. Attempts to meet the new Chancellor, 
Professor Dominique Obounou Akong, to discuss the issue failed. 
Two incidents fueled student unrest and sparked off renewed strike action. The first 
incident occurred on 16 April when the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Social 
Sciences, Professor Joseph-Marie Essomba, issued a circular canceling the first 
semester results of some third-year students who had not yet sat all their first-year 
examinations. It also announced that only students who had paid their tuition fees of 
FCFA 50,000 would have their results published. The students opposed these directives 
as being a violation of the text and spirit of the 1993 university reform decrees. They 
emphasized that these reforms stipulated that a 70 percent pass mark sufficed for 
promotion to the next class and that tuition fees were payable in two installments. 
Publication of the first semester results could therefore not be made dependent on 
payment of the second semester fees. The second incident took place on 2 May when 
the students were provoked by the arrogant behaviour of the Dean of the Faculty of 
Science, Professor Amougou Akwa. During a meeting with some of his students in front 
of the Chancellery he tried to round up the discussion by asking whether there was still 
another “sponger” (fainéant) who wanted to pose a question. The students saw this as 
further proof of the fact that the university authorities never took them seriously. 
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The next day, 3 May, members of Parliament started demonstrating on campus. 
They marched to the offices of both deans, chased students and lecturers out of the 
lecture rooms, mounted roadblocks, shattered windscreens and finally launched an 
attack on the Registrar’s office while chanting anti-chancellor songs in Pidgin English 
like “papa di suffer, Obounou di chop moni.” This signified the start of another 
protracted student strike. A new batch of Parliament leaders emerged with nicknames 
like Chairman Savimbi, Etienne Lautier, Fidel Castro and Thatcher, who declared a 
renewed Operation Ghost Campus. In subsequent days there were frequent 
confrontations between Parliament commandos and the security forces. Any students 
who were seen carrying books to or from campus were seized by members of 
Parliament, “baptized” with dirty water and urine, had their faces smeared with mud, 
and ordered to return to their rooms.  
Describing the new levies as “extortions,” some 3,000 members of Parliament 
marched on 6 May to the office of the Chancellor, Dominique Obounou Akong. During 
a meeting with some of their representatives, the Chancellor reportedly accused 
Parliament leaders of wickedness and questioned why they had never gone on strike 
when his predecessor, Peter Agbor Tabi, their Anglophone brother, imposed the new 
levies. He was nevertheless prepared to make some minor concessions, including a 
reduction of the toilet fee from FCFA 25 to FCFA 10 and the library fee from FCFA 
100 to FCFA 50. He finally threatened to kill any student caught destroying university 
property. The students were obviously not satisfied with the outcome of the meeting and 
held the Chancellor hostage in his office until late in the evening when gendarmes used 
tear gas and water canons to chase them back to their residential areas.20  
Following his failure to resolve the dispute, the Chancellor invited the Minister of 
Higher Education, Peter Agbor Tabi, to visit the campus and calm the students down. 
The following day, 7 May, the Minister went to the campus accompanied by over 200 
gendarmes but his provocative speech aggravated rather than resolved the crisis. He 
warned the students to resume classes and avoid the consequences of strike action, 
which he insinuated would be dealt with ruthlessly: 
 
You people already know me and the sanctions I can take against any of you caught 
striking. If you want to march, go on marching, but I advise you to run rather than to 
march. If you want violence, I will teach you what it means to love it.21 
 
He provoked the already irate students even further with his remark that higher 
education was not for the poor. The September catch-up session was for those who 
could pay since it was not compulsory and those who could not afford to pay university 
dues could as well go home and help their parents on their farms. After all, university 
enrollment figures were still quite high. As soon as he had left the campus, the security 
forces started dispersing the students. Using tear gas, water canons and batons they 
descended on the students, beating, injuring and arresting several of them. 
On 8 May, Parliament members marched in protest, chanting liberation songs and 
resorting to violence “to teach Agbor Tabi a lesson in humility.” They burnt down a 
section of one of the halls used for tutorials and attempted to set one of the lecture 
rooms ablaze but were chased away by the security forces that fired tear gas at them. 
They then blocked the free flow of traffic in neighbouring areas by setting on fire old 
tyres but were again tear gassed into hiding.  
Changing their strategy, they decided to present their grievances to the Anglophone 
Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, the following day. A team of three advisors in the 
Prime Minister’s office received a delegation of six Parliament leaders. The Prime 
Minister had instructed the team to resolve the immediate demands of the students and 
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tell them that he could only receive them after they had resumed classes. The team 
assured the students that all the arrested students would be released and that the forces 
of law and order would be withdrawn from campus the day after they resumed classes. 
It also promised the student delegation that the university authorities would victimize 
none of the strike leaders. Before the delegation left, the Prime Minister sent it a note in 
which he wrote: “After the resolution of your immediate demands, I will personally 
look into the other matters when you resume classes. The rule says obedience before 
complaint.” Parliament members, however, demanded concrete guarantees for what had 
been discussed. When these were not forthcoming, they continued to boycott classes. 
The Prime Minister, in turn, washed his hands of the matter, describing the students as 
“stubborn kids” who needed to be called to order by the university authorities and the 
government. 
Soon after the failure of this conciliation attempt, the Self-Defense group and Beti 
vigilante groups were reactivated on campus. In a communiqué, the Self-Defense group 
described the grievances of Parliament as legitimate but it stressed that the authorities 
had made concessions that should be reciprocated by the students. It regretted that 
Parliament preferred to resort to acts of vandalism rather than enter into negotiations 
with the administration, accusing its opponent of being manipulated by the radical 
opposition parties. It denounced arson on campus as an Anglo-Bami war against the 
Beti. In the face of what it described as a “premeditated conspiracy against the Beti and 
their patrimony,” it warned the Anglo-Bami students that “the period of relaxation was 
over.” It exhorted the latter to abandon what it referred to as their “Machiavellian 
Dance” and to go back and destroy property in their own region. It also resolved “that 
for every Beti student killed, one hundred Anglo-Bami students would be killed in 
reprisal.” It finally called on lecturers who sympathized with the strike to stop their 
maneuvers, “for your lives will be in danger and your wives will be raped.”22 
Despite such threats, Ghost Campus continued. The regime then employed the usual 
tactics of the stick and the carrot. A number of students, who went to inform the Prime 
Minister on 14 May that some students were still being detained, were arrested and 
severely beaten by the ninjas stationed around the Prime Minister’s office. A few days 
later, the Prime Minister published a press release asking students to go back to school 
and calling on the university authorities to respect the 1993 university reform decrees. 
Parliament leaders, however, considered this to be a vague text and demanded a text 
signed by President Biya confirming the Prime Minister’s decision. 
With the situation getting out of hand, the regime and the university authorities 
began to use the government-owned media as their negotiating table, proposing all 
kinds of concessions in these media without ever consulting the students. Parliament 
members felt that they were being taken for a ride and resorted to renewed violence, 
burning down another lecture room, beating and wounding a captured military captain, 
smashing windscreens of university authorities’ cars and disrupting the examinations of 
students at the Advanced Teachers’ Training College that had been scheduled to be held 
on the university campus on 21 May. Several arrests were reported. 
On 31 May, Parliament members assembled at Bassora, making new demands as a 
condition for their resumption of classes. Since the various levies imposed by the 
university authorities after the 1993 university reform decrees had been described as 
illegal by the Prime Minister in his press release of 16 May, they requested the 
reimbursement of all such extorted monies and reiterated their demand for a free catch-
up summer session.23 They called on the authorities to resolve their grievances within 48 
hours or face the consequences of what was dubbed Operation Storm Campus, 
programmed to take place on 3 June. Quoting President Biya’s notorious proverb that 
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“if you want peace, you should prepare for war” (Ndjana 1997), they cautioned that they 
would turn into terrorists should their grievances not be met within the deadline. On 3 
June, there were severe confrontations between Parliament members and the security 
forces and the Self-Defense group.  
Annoyed that the university authorities had failed to control the situation despite 
previous assurances, President Biya issued a decree on 5 June announcing the sacking 
of Chancellor Dominique Obounou Akong and his replacement by Professor Jean Messi 
Messi who was known as a hardliner.  
The new chancellor immediately took a number of far-reaching decisions. He 
withdrew the various levies and declared that the summer session that year would be 
free. Some of the levies already paid would be reimbursed. Since students nevertheless 
continued to boycott classes, he created a new vigilante group composed of non-
students that started terrorizing the students. 
A meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was to be held in Yaounde 
on 8 July so the government and the university authorities were anxious to re-establish 
control over the campus and to organize the second-semester examinations before that 
date. On 11 June, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Social Sciences issued a 
circular telling students who wished to sit the second-semester examinations (scheduled 
to take place on 24 June) to register. On the same day, a ministerial order was 
promulgated dismissing six Parliament leaders from the university for their role in the 
strike.  
The following day students stormed the campus to revoke the dismissal of their 
colleagues. One philosophy lecturer, Dr Ernest Menyomo, was beaten and almost 
lynched. Violent confrontations followed between Parliament members and the security 
forces, the Self-Defense group and the vigilante group. One of the arrested students, 
Benjamin Mvogo, was reported to have died the next day as a result of having been 
tortured. In the following days violent confrontations continued after the vigilante group 
destroyed maize fields near Bonamoussadi belonging to Anglo-Bami and the security 
forces raided students’ rooms in Bonamoussadi, arresting about 300 students. 
The strikers’ morale rapidly waned. The arrest and dismissal of their leaders, the 
reimbursement of some of the levies and the promise of a free summer session, the 
lengthy nature of the strike, and the wish of most students, especially those in their final 
year, to sit examinations were decisive factors in Parliament members ending their 
strike. As a result of the prolonged strike action, students were to sit their examinations 





In this study I have shown that the political liberalization process in Cameroon was 
marked by protracted and violent strike actions on the campus of the University of 
Yaounde during the period 1990-96. Political liberalization provided space for students 
to organize and to voice their multiple grievances about the poor living and study 
conditions on campus and the process of “institutional liberalization”, blocking their 
entry into the circle of the elite. While these conditions were aggravated in the 1990s 
with the introduction of tuition fees and the imposition of additional levies, the 
university authorities and the regime nevertheless continued to refuse to enter into any 
meaningful form of dialogue with the newly established student union. 
The unprecedented degree of violence that accompanied these protracted strikes 
must be mainly attributed to the fact that the political liberalization process tended to 
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divide students along party and ethno-regional lines. The major lines of division were 
between the Anglo-Bami students organized in Parliament and closely allied to the 
radical opposition and the autochthonous Beti students organized in the Committee for 
Self-Defense and Beti militia and closely allied to the regime in power. In their fight 
with Parliament, the latter groups resorted to violent forms of ethnic exclusion to re-
establish control over “their” university and to maintain “their” regime in power. 
Allowed by the regime to be armed, they provided invaluable support to the forces of 
law and order in the brutal repression of Parliament strikes. 
It is interesting to observe that in the aftermath of the 1996 student revolt the 
Committee for Self-Defense and Beti vigilante groups have been replaced on campus by 
a new group called PRESBY (or President Biya’s Youth). This group, which expresses 
its unshakable loyalty to President Biya, is mainly composed of university students and 
other sections of the educated youth either engaged in informal-sector activities or 
unemployed, including a number of university graduates and dropouts. Although the 
Beti youth appear to play a dominant role in this new movement, young people from 
other ethnic groups in search of prebends have also joined the group, thus giving 
PRESBY a national or multi-ethnic outlook. Recent experience has shown that 
PRESBY is creating a new recruiting ground for the formation of ethnic militia used by 
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